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Individuals with disorders of consciousness - such as the vegetative and 
minimally conscious states - are considered to have preserved wakefulness but 
absent or limited awareness of themselves and of their environments. A 
diagnosis of vegetative state (also called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome 
(Laureys et al. 2010)) is made when there is no motor evidence of awareness - 
i.e. visual pursuit, command-following - while a diagnosis of minimally conscious 
state is made when a patient exhibits only a limited response repertoire (Multi-
Society Task Force on PVS 1994; Giacino et al. 2002). This apparent dissociation 
between wakefulness and awareness has made the disorders of consciousness a 
fruitful model in which to characterise the neural mechanisms that are 
associated with, and which support, awareness. 
 
In this issue of Clinical Neurophysiology, Thul and colleagues investigated 
cortical information processing in 15 patients with chronic disorders of 
consciousness following a range of aetiologies (Thul et al., 2015). Specifically, 
they quantified the local information content of the electroencephalogram by 
means of permutation entropy, and the flow of information between cerebral 
lobes by means of symbolic transfer entropy. Entropy is a measure from 
information theory that describes the amount of information contained within a 
signal - in this case, an electrophysiological time series. The authors report a 
broad reduction in the information content (i.e. the complexity) of the EEG of 
patients with disorders of consciousness relative to that of healthy controls, and 
a reduction in information flow from frontal scalp to posterior scalp. Time-
frequency entropy measurements in EEG also correlate with depth of and 
emergence from anesthesia (Vakkuri et al., 2004), which offers some support to 
the authors’ hypothesis that entropy measurements correlate with at least crude 
consciousness.  
 
Reduced complexity of the EEG and event-related potentials (ERP) of patients 
with disorders of consciousness has been observed with a number of other 
methods (e.g. Casali et al. 2013; King et al. 2013a). For example, the 
Perturbational Complexity Index quantifies the complexity of the ERP evoked by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and has been shown to track 
behavioural signs of awareness (e.g. disorders of consciousness, sleep, sedation; 
(Ferrarelli et al. 2010; Massimini et al. 2010; Casali et al. 2013)). Furthermore, 
feed-back connectivity is central to a number of theories of consciousness 
(Dehaene et al. 2006; Balduzzi and Tononi 2009; Friston 2010), and its 
impairment has been observed in both altered and disordered states of 
consciousness (Boly et al. 2011; 2012). 
 
While Thul and colleagues observe differences between patients and healthy 
control participants, they do not observe reliable differences between the levels 
of the disorder - i.e. between vegetative state and minimally conscious state. 
Indeed, the complexity metrics show considerable overlap across these two 
states. From a clinical perspective, the described method for quantifying EEG 
data is therefore unlikely to improve the accuracy of differential diagnoses in this 
group. Nevertheless, Thul and colleagues report that the foci of the complexity 
decrements were consistent with each patient’s specific pathology - i.e. focally 
reduced information content over left-frontal scalp in one patient with left-
  
frontal subdural hematoma. Therefore, while these complexity measures do not 
track the behavioural profiles of the patients, they may provide information 
about underlying cortical damage. A study with a larger cohort may also uncover 
differences between aetiologies that reflect the known patterns of pathology 
(Adams et al. 1982; 2000). Furthermore, there is evidence that oddball tasks, 
such as the own-name paradigm employed by Thul and colleagues, have both 
diagnostic and prognostic value (Faugeras et al. 2012; King et al. 2013b). 
Therefore, the combination of classical ERP analyses and complexity metrics of 
the same data may provide a greater level of clinical utility. 
 
As the described entropy metrics did not reliably differentiate patients in the 
vegetative state from those in a minimally conscious state, it is also likely that 
they do not track consciousness per se. Indeed, patients in the vegetative state 
are ostensibly unconscious, while those in the minimally conscious state have at 
least some level of consciousness (Giacino et al. 2002). A potential confound that 
may have obscured differences between conscious and unconscious patients is 
the known difficulty of diagnosing disorders of consciousness (Childs et al. 
1993), such that some conscious patients may have been mistakenly diagnosed 
as unconscious. However, Thul and colleagues employed the gold standard 
behavioural assessment tool for these disorders, namely the Coma Recovery 
Scale - Revised (Kalmar and Giacino 2005), which is known to result in greater 
diagnostic accuracy (Schnakers et al. 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, a group of patients exist who have been misdiagnosed as 
vegetative state even by the clinical gold standard assessment tool. Such patients 
demonstrate abilities indicative of consciousness during assessment with 
functional neuroimaging, but fail to demonstrate these abilities with their 
behaviour (Fernandez-Espejo and Owen 2013). If these misdiagnosed patients 
are fully conscious and only appear to be unconscious due to a primarily motor 
deficit, it follows that the complexity of their EEG signals should fall within the 
range of healthy individuals. Indeed, the structure of the EEG networks of a 
misdiagnosed vegetative state patient have been previously shown to be more 
similar to healthy individuals (Chennu et al. 2014), suggesting that some 
misdiagnosed patients possess a level of consciousness similar to that of healthy 
individuals.  
 
The same logic can be applied to patients in the minimally conscious state. 
Indeed, it is unclear to what extent ‘minimally’ conscious implies full 
consciousness but only some of the time, or a lower/different level of 
consciousness than that experienced by awake healthy individuals (Kotchoubey 
et al. 2014). A theoretically-driven index of ‘conscious’ processing that has also 
been validated in other altered states of consciousness (e.g. sleep, sedation) may 
speak to this conundrum, and shine a light on these important clinical challenges 
while simultaneously contributing to our search for the neural underpinnings of 
consciousness. 
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